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I. Introduction
Students in their first course in economics learn that every country faces three problems that
it must resolve. What goods will be produced? How will it produce these goods? And, who will get
the goods produced? Since the questions deal with economic matters, it is usually assumed
that markets will determine the answers. But political forces in government can also provide results.
Milton Friedman has observed that every country answers some aspects of each question through
market forces and other aspects through the political system. The proportions vary greatly
from country to country. At one extreme would be the old Soviet Union and The People’s Republic
of China under Mao Tse-tung. At the other extreme would be the British Colony of Hong Kong and
the United States before the Great Depression. In between are all shades. Cuba, Sweden, Germany,
the U. K., the U. S. today, Chile, and Taiwan lie along the line moving from more government
control to more market control.
What can we say about these two systems for answering the above questions? Each system
must have some advantages, for each is used, though in widely varying proportions. The close
relation is shown by the early reference to “economics” as “political economy.”
To examine the results we can expect from using each of these systems, we will first look at
some broad, general forces that operate in each system. Then we will use the fundamental principles
of demand and supply to predict outcomes, and evaluate results. We hope that from
these considerations, the strengths and weaknesses of each system will be apparent and each individual will be better able to make wiser choices in answering the basic questions cited above.
II. Deciding with Votes Versus Deciding with Money
In 1959 Gary Becker, a young Professor at Columbia and a later Nobel Laureate in economics, compared the two ways of producing and allocating goods. He noted that a person could take
his money, go into the market, and choose the goods on which he wished to spend his funds. That
action would determine what goods were produced, how they were produced, and who got them.
Similarly, a person could take her vote, go to the polls, cast it for the politician in favor of having
government order the production of goods she liked, made the way she preferred, and distributed to
the people she thought most deserving. The two systems seemed mirror images of each other. But
were there features that make one superior to the other? Becker cited several areas where the two
systems differ. We shall discuss three of them.
First, when a person votes for her representative, that person elected will serve for two, four,
or six years and cannot be replaced until his term ends. A person may have voted for Bill Clinton
who promised in 1992 to reduce taxes, but in the following year raised them markedly. But
Mr. Clinton had three more years to serve and could not be removed.

In a market, however, you may enter a Safeway store, based on its promise of quality products, good service, or a large inventory. If Safeway fails to deliver to your satisfaction, you may fire
it then and there. You need never patronize it again. Market goods can change rapidly.
Government goods change slowly. Not only can the politician remain in office and with power after
his services are no longer desired, but the bureaucrat who administers the laws usually has, in effect,
a lifetime appointment. An example of a service tied to long tenure is the provision of justice.
It should be swift and sure. Instead, it is interminably slow and often random. Federal judges have
lifetime tenure. Improving the delivery of justice will take decades, if it can be done at all.
Professional arbitrators, however, can be replaced swiftly and their services reflect this condition.
Second, Consumer Reports has long complained about the “bundling” of features on automobiles. In order to get the car with the color and power you want, you may have to buy other equipment that you do not want. The product should be “unbundled,” so the consumer would receive and
pay for only the features desired.
When the voter elects a mayor, senator, or other official, that person will represent the voter
on a large number of issues. The voter may like her congressman’s position on the minimum wage,
but vigorously oppose his position on most-favored-nation treatment for China. A congressman
will represent his constituents on about a thousand pieces of legislation during his two-year term.
Many constituents, even those who actively favored him, will support his position on some of these
bills but strongly oppose him on others. The congressman is a bundled good, and the voter will be
forced to pay for many results she does not want. Dwight Lee has used a Safeway grocery analogy:
the consumer enters the store and is confronted with a full grocery cart, containing some goods she
wants and some she does not. Her choice is the cart or nothing. In government she must take
the representative’s bundle; she cannot choose nothing.
In markets, one is not forced to buy all goods from only one supplier. Sears or Wal-Mart
will not be the single source of all goods for any consumer. You can vote for only one congressman
who will provide you with thousands of rules affecting what is produced, how it is made, and who
gets the goods, but in markets you can vote for hundreds, if not thousands, of suppliers of private
goods. Even in the purchase of food, the consumer may buy bread at one store, meats at another,
and vegetables at a third. In markets a consumer is seldom forced to pay for a good he does not want
or that is produced in a way he does not like; in government purchases, he often is.
A third difference between government provision of goods and that done by markets involves
what economists call rational ignorance. This can be either costly or inexpensive.
Because the Congress will take action on over a thousand bills during a given session, the
typical voter cannot be informed on each and every bill. In fact, he will be completely ignorant
about almost all of these bills. This does not imply disinterest in government, laziness, or an inability
to understand the bills presented. Rather, the voter is rationally ignorant about these proposals, for
he has his own life to lead, family to care for, job to pursue, church to attend, sports team to enjoy
and support, and a thousand other things to occupy his time and attention. There is little left over to
be spent on these peripheral political issues, many of which may not interest him. Further, even
should he pause and study any issue and try to urge his representative to vote on it intelligently, his
voice is likely to be lost among the thousands of others also affected. He will be ignorant about
ninety-nine percent of all items that come before his congress, legislature, council, or district governing body, and rationally so. His time can be spent more profitably elsewhere. This ignorance
is costly to him, but removing it is even more expensive. He is destined to be a loser on most of
these government-provided items.
In his purchases and work in private markets, he will also be rationally ignorant about almost
all products offered. But these will be products he will not purchase and will not pay for. Most of us

are rationally ignorant about the features and cost of yachts, for example. The price
system determines how it is produced, and we need not be concerned about others who spend their
own money for this product, for we will not spend our money on it. This form of rational ignorance
is not costly to the individual.
The late Mancur Olson was an early expositor of a fundamental
rule of political action. Every law, rule, or regulation by government helps some group and imposes
costs on others. A proposal is likely to become law if it concentrates the benefits in the hands of a
few people so that each enjoys a sizable gain; while at the same time it spreads the costs over a large
population, so each loser bears only a small absolute expense. The gainers, then, have a strong
incentive to support the proposal, while the losers have little reason to oppose it actively. They are
better off remaining rationally ignorant, spending their time on matters more important to themselves. This provides a strong incentive to prospective gainers to offer a great many proposals that
may do little good, at great cost. Rational ignorance when government allocates resources not
only creates inefficiency in these programs, it also encourages small groups, often called special
interests, to press for allocating more and more goods in this manner. In effect, inefficiency breeds
even more inefficiency.
There are some goods, called “public goods” because many people automatically benefit
from the good if anyone receives it, that many think government should provide. Examples are
neighborhood attractiveness, fireworks displays, water quality, and radio broadcasts. Still,
many economists argue markets can provide these goods more efficiently than government can.
When we rely on government, even when democratically elected, to provide the goods we
want, produced the way we want, and allocated to the people we want to receive them, we will get
fewer of the goods we want, more of the goods we do not want, and encourage the increased use of
this inefficient system. Markets are designed to overcome these weaknesses.
III. Demand and Supply of Goods Under Each System
When there is a scarcity of goods and a need to allocate them, Economists turn first to the
concepts of demand and supply. These powerful tools will help us examine our questions in a
different light and give us significant insights.
We know that people want lots of units of many goods and services, but they cannot have all
they want. The concept of demand tells us a person will take more of a good the less expensive it is
and that he will demand each good until he gets about the same happiness from the last dollar
he spends on the last unit of each good. If he buys a $20 shirt and a $2 pair of socks, he should get
about ten times as much satisfaction from the new shirt as from the additional pair of socks. He is
then getting about the same happiness from the last dollar spent on each of these goods.
When we answer our three questions using the concept of demand, we know each consumer
will look at the many goods out there and their prices, and decide which goods will bring him the
greatest happiness from the dollars he spends on them. He knows why he does not buy some goods
he likes and why he does not buy more units of some of the goods he does purchase. The goods are
not worth the price. He will be as happy as is possible with his income when he follows these rules
of demand.
When government produces or allocates goods, it usually provides them at a low or zero
price. Schools, police protection, justice in the courts, clean air and water, Medicaid, occupational
safety, and welfare payments are all seen as virtually free goods. Many other goods are
subsidized, such as public transportation, public housing, and Medicare. When the price of a good is
low, or even zero, consumers will want more of it than they would voluntarily have bought at its cost
of production. Think how much more food, clothing, and shelter you would buy if the units you

want were fifty percent cheaper, or free.
Thus, too much of the good will be produced, meaning we will have to give up other more
valuable goods to get these less valuable units of the subsidized or free good. Remember the fundamental economic rule: there is no free lunch, or even a cheap, subsidized, lunch. It just appears free
or cheap. We give up beer, tires, and encyclopedias that are more valuable than the value of what
we get in cleaner air, higher SAT scores, or better housing for the poor. In fact, added expenditures
on these last three items have often given us dirtier air, lower SAT scores, and fewer housing units
for the poor.
But when the government-provided goods do supply some positive, but small, benefit, we
might think, “Well, at least the recipients will be happier.” Strangely, they are far more likely to be
dissatisfied with what they have received. First, the extra units are not worth much to them,
and second, they will be unhappy because government will not provide them with all the goods they
are willing to buy at the low prices. People are more likely to be unhappy over receiving public
housing and public transportation than over not getting expensive housing and Lincoln Town cars.
Price sends the wrong signal for the first two goods and the right signal for the latter two. Recall the
widespread public dissatisfaction during the 1974 Arab boycott when government set gasoline
prices below market levels but could not provide all the gasoline people were willing to buy.
Government provision of goods generally creates wasteful consumption and consumer
dissatisfaction, a doubly bad result. Market provision leaves consumers happy with what they got
and a clear understanding of why they do not want more units which are not worth their cost. The
concept of supply tells economists that if demanders will pay a higher price for a good, more units
will be produced. Further, this price must cover the cost of the land, labor, and capital needed to turn
out these units. If demanders will not pay for the good, it will not be produced. Waste will be
avoided. Firms that produce goods that people do not want will go bankrupt. This is how markets
avoid wasteful activities.
Markets also promote efficiency. People who learn to provide a better or less expensive good
make profits. We call them Ray Kroc or Bill Gates. Markets provide a strong incentive to supply
only goods people want badly enough to pay their cost of production. Government- provided
goods, however, almost never face bankruptcy. The mail may be late, children may learn little in
public schools, Medicare fraud may cost billions, job training programs may leave participants
worse off, but none of these programs has been declared a failure or abandoned. There are at least
two features that help explain these supply results.
First, those who produce these failed products have little incentive to improve them. The
person who produces a better oil drill bit, internet browser, or wash and wear fabric can make millions from the improvement. Incentives for government employees or administrators to improve
government programs are almost nonexistent. No incentive; no improvement.
Second, the incentives facing government workers are, in fact, to produce a bad product.
Schools can get bigger budgets if their students are failing. The judiciary can get more funds if its
cases take longer. The police can improve funding if there is more crime in schools and on the
streets. In terms of a supply curve, we are not getting more units of schooling provided at a higher
price; we are shifting the supply curve for education upward and getting less education at the same
price, or equal education at a higher price. This condition applies to almost all government-produced
products; failure pays.

IV. Conclusions
Governments can provide goods or markets can do the job. The two Systems appear similar,
but they are very different. The general problems of slow response of government because of political tenure, the bunching of decisions made by government officials, and costly rational ignorance by
voters all argue for abandoning this inefficient system.
When government provides goods, people will demand too much of useless goods and
become unhappy because they were not provided more and better products. Governmental agencies
producing goods have little incentive to become efficient and significant incentives to turn out failed
products. They also need not fear a prospect of bankruptcy or competition.
Markets, on the other hand, change quickly, allow many producers, and do not burden those
who are ignorant of goods they do not buy. Further, consumers will demand only those goods that
benefit them most and suppliers will become efficient or become bankrupt. We often choose government as our preferred provider on the basis of emotion. If we can substitute understanding for
emotion, we may become healthier, and we will certainly become wealthier as we become wiser.
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